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Over the course of the past several years,
the Supreme Court has revitalized the
Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution as a check on the legislature. In
United States v. Lopez1 and United States v.
Morrison,2 the Supreme Court invalidated two
federal laws for violating the Commerce
Clause. A number of scholars have emphasized
that these opinions are of potentially great
importance for the future vitality of federal
environmental regulations.3 Most of the
emphasis has been placed on a consideration
of the effect of these laws on major environ-
mental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).4
However, even minor federal environmental
statutes are potentially imperiled by the new
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
This note focuses on a provision of one of
these lesser-known statutes, section 7 of the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA),5 and
whether it would endure the scrutiny of the
Supreme Court if it were challenged for violat-
ing the Commerce Clause. This note will ini-
tially focus on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Swanson Mining Corp. v. F.E.R.C.,6 which provides
a factual and legal context for analyzing sec-
tion 7 and related federal statutes. Then this
note will discuss the Supreme Court’s
Swanson Mining Reconsidered: 
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1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence and how
lower courts have applied it to environmental
statutes. Next, using the factual context pro-
vided by Swanson Mining, section 7 will be
examined to determine whether it would with-
stand a direct Commerce Clause challenge.
Finally, this note will consider the wisdom of
using the Commerce Clause to overturn feder-
al environmental laws.
II.  Swanson Mining v. FERC—Holding
and Statutory Background.
A.   D.C. Circuit’s Decision 
In 1986, the Swanson Mining company
brought an action before the D.C. Circuit chal-
lenging the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s (FERC) denial of an evidentiary
licensing hearing.7 Swanson Mining had
requested from FERC an exemption from fed-
eral licensing requirements for its proposed
hydroelectric project on Madden Creek, a
small, non-navigable tributary of the South
Fork of the Trinity River.8 The mining company
wanted to refurbish an old hydroelectric facili-
ty (a dam) and divert water from the creek to
generate electricity for sale to Pacific Gas &
Electric Co.9 The mining company based its
request for an exemption from the Federal
Power Act’s (FPA) licensing requirement on a
section of the Energy Security Act that empow-
ers FERC “to exempt certain small hydroelec-
tric projects from this licensing requirement.”10
However, in 1981, the South Fork of the Trinity
River had been designated as a wild and scenic
river to be administered by the state of
California.11 FERC concluded that it was “with-
out authority to approve the project proposed
in Swanson’s exemption application because
of the project’s impact on a wild and scenic
river.”12 The D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s deter-
mination that the WSRA “prohibited FERC
from issuing an exemption for construction ‘on
or directly affecting’ a wild and scenic river as
well as construction having an ‘adverse effect’
on scenic values.”13
B.  Federal Power Act and Federal
Preemption
FERC’s authority and functions have tradi-
tionally been grounded in the federal govern-
ment’s pro-development policies toward
rivers.14 In 1920, the federal government enact-
ed the Federal Water Power Act, now the FPA,
in order to promote the utilization of the
nation’s rivers for hydroelectric power.15 This
act created the Federal Power Commission,
which later became FERC, as the administra-
tive agency regulating the placement and con-
struction of dams.16 Thus, the FPA was enacted
with the purpose to stimulate economic
growth in an orderly manner.17
However, the licensing of hydroelectric
facilities has been a source of controversy
since the enactment of the FPA,18 stemming
from a long-standing disagreement over
whether federal or state law governs hydroelec-
tric facilities.19 The aim of the FPA, through
FERC, is to issue licenses for the optimum
improvement or development of waterways.20
Section 9(b) of the FPA suggests that a pro-
posed project must comply with state law in
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7.  Swanson Mining, 790 F.2d at 98.  FERC is the federal agency
that administers electricity generation in general and the devel-
opment of hydroelectric facilities on rivers in particular.  Eric L.
Hiser, Piloting the Preservation/Development Balance on the Wild and
Scenic Rivers, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1044, 1046 (1988).
8.  Id..
9.  Id. at  99.  The dam was originally built in the 1930s.
10.  Id. at 98.  
11. Id.
12. Id. at 100. 
13.  Id. at 103.




18.  Id. at 1047.
19.  Evan L. Delgado & Jon R. Vaught, Hydroelectric Power, the
Federal Power Act, and State Water Laws: Is Federal Preemption Water Over
the Dam? 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1179, 1180–85 (1984).   
20. Id.
21.  16 U.S.C. § 802 (2000).
However, in the 1946 case First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Coop v. FPC, the Supreme Court held that
the Federal Power Commission Act preempted
state law in the issuing of permits for the con-
struction of power projects.22 This issue was
revisited in California v. FERC,23 in which the
Court reaffirmed FERC’s authority to issue
licenses for the construction of hydroelectric
dams without state law compliance.24
Therefore, FERC’s very strong, pro-develop-
ment role has been bolstered by the preemp-
tion of state law by federal law.
C.  Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
Despite FERC’s broad authority, the D.C.
Circuit in Swanson Mining determined that
FERC’s broad authority was not without limit,
and was subject to the WSRA.25 The federal
government enacted the WSRA in 1968 in
response to public disillusionment with feder-
al policy favoring the development of rivers.26
Specifically, Congress determined there was a
need to protect the “outstanding remarkable
scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife,
historic, cultural or other values” of certain
rivers.27 Accordingly, the WSRA was aimed at
creating free-flowing sections of rivers to fulfill
certain “vital national conservation purpos-
es.”28 According to Professor Brian Gray,
“Congress’ goals were decidedly preservation-
ist.”29 Today, there are more than 11,000 miles
on 158 rivers that are protected by the WSRA.30
Upon the passage of the WSRA in 1968,
Congress “designated parts of eight rivers, set
twenty-seven others aside for study, and estab-
lished a river classification system.”31 Under
the WSRA, “[e]ither Congress or a state, with
Secretary of Interior approval, can designate a
river for inclusion in the federal wild and scenic
rivers system.”32 A river that is designated by a
state is the responsibility of that state to man-
age, with the federal government responsible
for only federal land and the actions of federal
agencies.33 A federal agency may recommend a
river for designation as a wild and scenic river;
however, that agency must submit a report
detailing the reasons the river should be
included in the wild and scenic rivers system,
considering the adverse economic effects of
designation.34
A WSRA-designated river receives a num-
ber of benefits,35 with the “heart of the act”
being section 7.36 The purpose of section 7 is to
insure that a designated river’s water is free-
flowing and unimpeded.37 Section 7 requires
that FERC “shall not license the construction of
any dam, water conduit, reservoir, powerhouse,
transmission line, or other project under the
Federal Power Act.”38 FERC may not approve a
license “on or directly affecting any river which
is designated . . . as a component of the nation-
al wild and scenic rivers system.”39 In addition,
no federal agencies may assist in the construc-
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22.  328 U.S. 152, 182 (1945).
23.  495 U.S. 490 (1990).
24.  Id. at 506–07.  In California v. FERC, the issue was state
mandated minimum flow requirements with which the licensee
was not complying. Id. 
25.  790 F.2d. at 96, 98 (D.C. Cir. !986).
26.  Hiser, supra note 7, at 1047.
27.  16 U.S.C.  § 1271 (2000).
28.  Id. 
29.  Brian Gray, No Holier Temple: Protecting the National Parks
Through Wild and Scenic River Designation, 58 U. COLO. L. Rev. 551, 553
(1987).
30.  Charlton H. Bonham, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and The
Oregon Trilogy, 21 PUB. LAND L. REV. 109, 111 (2000).  
31.  Id. at 117.
32.  Id. at 118.
33.  16 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (2000).
34.  Id. § 1275(a).
35.  Section 10 of the WSRA requires that the federal agency
that has jurisdiction over a  river section must enhance and pro-
tect the scenic values of the river that Congress sought to protect.
16 U.S.C. § 1281(a).  Additionally, section 12 of the WSRA requires
that agencies that have power over adjacent federal lands to
manage lands with an eye to protecting the values of the desig-
nated river that congress sought to protect. Id. § 1283(a).
36.  Peter Frost, Protecting and Enhancing Wild and Scenic Rivers
in the West, 29 IDAHO L.R. 313, 323 (1992).
37.  Id.
38.  16 U.S.C. § 1278(a).
39.  Id.
designated. FERC may, however, issue a
license for a segment of a river “below or above
a wild, scenic or recreational river area.”40
Thus, section 7 of the WSRA substantially lim-
its FERC’s power to issue licenses on designat-
ed rivers, a limit recognized by the Swanson
Mining court.
III. The New Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence.
In the United States, every law enacted by
Congress must stem from one of the limited
powers enumerated in the Constitution.41 The
scope of Congress’ power is always to be con-
sidered in light of our dual system of govern-
ment known as federalism.42 According to
James Madison: “[t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal govern-
ment are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite.”43 In Morrison, the Court empha-
sized that “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a
coordinate branch of Government demands
that we invalidate a statute only upon a plain
showing that Congress has exceeded its con-
stitutional bounds.”44 However, the Court went
on to state that “[n]o doubt the political
branches have a role in interpreting and apply-
ing the Constitution, but ever since Marbury
this Court has remained the ultimate expositor
of the constitutional text.”45 Recently, the
Supreme Court has reinvigorated the
Commerce Clause as a constraint on congres-
sional power to enact legislation.46
A.  Brief History of the Supreme Court’s  
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Prior to 
Lopez
In 1824, the Supreme Court in Gibbons v.
Ogden established that Congress has the power
to regulate navigable waters as it deems nec-
essary, and this power “may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limita-
tions, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution.”47 Since this decision, the Court
has given Congress great deference in regulat-
ing the nation’s waterways.48
In contrast to this deference, the Court ini-
tially looked askance at attempts by Congress
to regulate economic activities that did not fit
under a strict definition of interstate com-
merce. For example, in 1895 the Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply
to manufacturing companies because the man-
ufacturer of goods only has an indirect rela-
tionship to interstate commerce; thus, the
attempt to regulate manufacturing was uncon-
stitutional.49
However, beginning in 1937, the Supreme
Court began to take a more expansive view of
the Commerce Clause.50 In 1942, the Court
held in Wickard v. Filburn that even the produc-
tion of a small amount of wheat produced
wholly intrastate for home consumption was
an example of interstate commerce that may
be regulated by Congress.51 The Court rea-
soned that if the effects of everyone engaged in
this activity were aggregated, the total effect
would cease to be trivial, and thus, congres-
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40.  16 U.S.C. § 1278(a).
41.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598, 607–08
(2000).
42.  Id.
43.  The Federalist No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison).
44.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
45.  Id. at 616.
46. Id. at 607–08. This follows a pattern whereby the
Rhenquist Court has sought to systematically limit the power of
Congress.  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507–8
(1997) (limiting the ability of Congress to use section 5 of the
14th Amendment to enact legislation based on a perceived con-
stitutional violation).
47.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9  Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
48.  See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377 (1940) (holding that the Commerce Clause allows
the federal government to enjoin the construction of a hydro-
electric dam that is not in compliance with the FPA because the
FPA is a valid exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate naviga-
ble bodies of water). 
49.  United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895).
50.  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1937)
(holding that the act enabling the National Labor Relations
Board’s regulations of labor/management relations was constitu-
tional).
51.  317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
mate.52 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
greatly expanded the power of Congress to reg-
ulate actions that are only indirectly related to
interstate commerce. 
Over the course of the next few decades,
the Supreme Court continued to expand the
power of Congress to regulate activities.
Finally, in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court held
that where there is any rational basis for con-
cluding that a congressional regulation affects
interstate commerce, the law is
constitutional.53
This standard was applied to an environ-
mental statute in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
Reclamation Ass’n.54 In Hodel, the Court upheld
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act’s regulation of strip mining as a valid
enactment under the Commerce Clause.55 The
Court reasoned that the designation of an
activity as “local” or “intrastate” does not
resolve the question of whether Congress may
regulate it under the Commerce Clause.56
Rather, the Court held that “when Congress has
determined that an activity affects interstate
commerce, the courts need inquire only
whether the finding is rational.”57
B.  The Commerce Clause After Lopez
The Rehnquist Court has revitalized feder-
alism and subjected federal laws to greater
scrutiny.58 The Court has revisited the earlier
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and thrown
into question the “rational basis” test of
Katzenbach. The new test, while not explicitly
overruling any of the previous Court decisions,
indicates that the Court will be examining con-
gressional statutes with greater scrutiny. In
United States v. Lopez, the Court found that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was uncon-
stitutional because it violated the Commerce
Clause.59 This was the first time in more than
60 years that the Supreme Court had used the
Commerce Clause as a reason to invalidate a
statute.60 The Court indicated that Congress
may regulate three types of activity under the
Commerce Clause: use of the channels of inter-
state commerce;61 “the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities;”62
and activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce.63 The Supreme Court divided
activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce into two subcategories: activities
that are commercial in nature and activities
that are not.64 For commercial activities, a par-
ticular instance of that activity does not have
to affect interstate commerce provided that the
activity collectively affects interstate com-
merce.65 However, in the case of noncommer-
cial activities, the activity must have a signifi-
cant connection to interstate commerce in
order for Congress to legitimately regulate it.66
The Court in Lopez found that the congression-
al gun crime statute was an unconstitutional
attempt to regulate a non-commercial activity
that had an attenuated connection to inter-
state commerce.67
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52.  Id. at 127–28.
53.  379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (establishing the deferential
“rational basis” test for determining whether a congressional
statute complies with the commerce clause or not).
54.  452 U.S. 264 (1981).
55.  Id. at 305.
56.  Id. at 281.
57.  Id. at 277.
58.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding
that Congress cannot require a state to submit to suit in state
courts under a federal statute because it is a violation of a state’s
sovereign immunity); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the com-
mandeering of a state’s legislature);  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).
59.  514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
60.  The last previous case in which the Supreme Court over-
turned a statute based on the Commerce Clause was Carter v.
Carter Coal Company. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
61.  Lopez, 514 U.S at 558. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id.
64.  Id. at 560.
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 561.
67.  Id. at 564.
might have been an aberration.68 This specula-
tion, however, was put to rest when the
Supreme Court reached its decision in Morrison,
a second application of the Court’s new
Commerce Clause standard.69 In Morrison, the
Supreme Court held that a provision of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) allowing
women to bring civil suits in federal court
against a perpetrator of violence violated the
Commerce Clause.70 The Court reasoned:
[Gender]-motivated crimes of vio-
lence are not economic activity. While
we need not adopt a categorical rule
against aggregating the effects of non-
economic activity in order to decide
these cases, thus far in our Nation’s
history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of inter-
state commerce only where that activi-
ty is economic in nature.71
The Court also held that “[t]he Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local.”72 This ration-
ale extends the logic developed in Lopez, clear-
ly indicating that the Court will view with great
suspicion Congress’ attempt to regulate activi-
ties that are not economic or commercial in
nature, especially when the activities have tra-
ditionally been governed by local authority.
In both Lopez and Morrison, Justice Thomas
expressed a position that is significantly more
restrictive than the one adopted by the Morrison
majority.73 In his concurrence in Morrison,
Justice Thomas reiterated the objections he
had to the new Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence:
I write separately only to express
my view that the very notion of a “sub-
stantial effects” test under the
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with
the original understanding of
Congress’ powers and with this Court’s
early Commerce Clause cases. By con-
tinuing to apply this rootless and mal-
leable standard, however circum-
scribed, the court has encouraged the
Federal Government to persist in its
view that the Commerce Clause has
virtually no limits. Until this Court
replaces its existing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence with a standard more
consistent with the original under-
standing, we will continue to see
Congress appropriating state police
powers under the guise of regulating
commerce.74
Under Justice Thomas’s standard, the Court
would return to a pre-New Deal understanding
of the Commerce Clause.75 This view of the
Commerce Clause represents a pole towards
which the Supreme Court may be heading. 
In 2000, the Supreme Court also reached
unanimous decisions in two other Commerce
Clause cases. In Jones v. United States, Justice
Ginsberg writing for the Court concluded that
an owner-occupied residence did not fall with-
in the jurisdictional hook of the federal arson
statute, which required that the property be
“used in interstate or foreign commerce or in
any activity affecting interstate commerce.”76
The Court held that the Government’s applica-
tion of the statute in this case was unconstitu-
tional.77 Jones illustrates that the Court will
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68.  John P. Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits of
Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environment,  25 Envtl. L. Rep.
10,408 (Aug. 1995). 
69.  529 U.S. 598 (2000).
70.  Id. at 613.
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. at 617–18.
73.  In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Thomas emphasized an
originalist, pre-New Deal understanding of the word commerce.
He reasserted the earlier distinctions between manufacturing
and commerce articulated in E.C. Knight.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 598
(Thomas, J., concurring).
74.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
75.  In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote: “I am
aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the
power flowing from the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does
our substantial effects test.  My review of the case law indicates
that the substantial effects test is but an innovation of the
Twentieth Century.” 514 U.S. at 596 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76.  529 U.S. 848, 852 (2000).
77.  Id.
limiting its query to facial challenges, to deter-
mine whether it comports with the Court’s new
understanding of the Commerce Clause.  
In Reno v. Condon, the Court continued to
define its new Commerce Clause standard.78
The Court held in this case that Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act of 1994 was constitutional and
“that the personal, identifying information that
the DPPA regulates is a ‘thing in interstate
commerce,’ and that the sale or release of that
information in interstate commerce is there-
fore a proper subject of congressional regula-
tion.”79 Reno indicates that the Court will con-
tinues to apply a deferential standard when it
comes to Congressional regulation of goods
traveling in interstate commerce. 
C.  Federal Courts, the Commerce Clause
and Federal Environmental Law
While the Supreme Court has not directly
used the Commerce Clause to invalidate a fed-
eral environmental law,80 a number of environ-
mental laws have been challenged in lower fed-
eral courts since Lopez.81 These courts have
upheld the constitutionality of the challenged
laws. The majority opinions of these decisions,
and Justice Stevens’s dissent in Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) present rea-
soning that could be used to support uphold-
ing section 7 of the WSRA. 
In National Association of Home Builders v.
Babbitt, the takings provision of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA)82 was chal-
lenged as being an invalid exercise of
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.83 In
National Association, a land developer sought an
injunction to prevent the application of the
ESA protecting an endangered fly. In National
Association, the application of the ESA to protect
an endangered fly had the effect of prohibiting
building upon property belonging to a land
developer. Although the D.C. Circuit upheld
the takings provision of the ESA as constitu-
tional, the three-judge panel produced a prin-
cipal opinion, a concurrence and a dissent.84 In
the principal opinion, Judge Wald found that
the takings provision of the ESA was constitu-
tional because it met the requirements of the
first prong of the Lopez test: it validly regulated
a channel of interstate commerce.85 Judge Wald
also held that Congress has the power to con-
trol the channels of interstate commerce and
keep them free from “immoral and injurious
uses.”86 In addition, Judge Wald reasoned that
the activity controlled by the takings provision
of the ESA could be viewed as non-commeri-
cial in nature, but that under Lopez even non-
commercial activity may be regulated if, for
example, it “would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce by depriving commercial
actors of access to an important natural
resource-biodiversity.”87 Judge Wald, citing
Hodel, also reasoned that the takings provision
was constitutional because it prevented the
adverse effects of destructive competition.88
Judge Henderson concurred, agreeing only that
loss of biodiversity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.89 Judge Sentelle’s dissent
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78.  528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
79.  Id. at 148.
80.  In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court could have invalidated  the
Corps’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act, but instead held
that the agency misinterpreted the statute in making the rule.
531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC]. 
81.  In addition to the appellate court cases discussed
below, there have been a handful of district court decisions in
which environmental laws have been upheld after a Commerce
Clause challenge.  See, e.g., United States v. Lundquist, 932 F.
Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1986) (concluding that possession of eagle
parts is an activity that may validly be regulated by congress
under the Commerce Clause).
82.  Section 9 of the ESA prohibits individuals from taking
species that are listed as endangered.  16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1973).
Taking has been defined as any effort to “harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” 16 U.S.C. §
1532(19).
83.  130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
84.  Id.  Due to the panel split, this case may be of limited
precedential value.
85.  Id. at 1046.
86.  Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558
(1995)).  
87.  Id. at 1054.  This determination has been thrown into
doubt by the reasoning of Morrison, which strongly suggests that
statutes regulating non-economic activity are suspect.
88.  Id. at 1055.
89.  Id. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
fell outside the enumerated powers of
Congress and that this decision by the appel-
late court represented an interference by the
federal government in a local land use matter
better left to the states.90
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held in Gibbs v.
Babbitt that the takings provision of the ESA
does not violate the Commerce Clause.91
Applying the Lopez and Morrison tests, Judge
Wilkinson found that the Supreme Court had
defined commercial activity in an expansive
fashion, and that courts should not define con-
temporary economic activities with 18th centu-
ry definitions.92 Judge Wilkinson found that the
taking of red wolves substantially affected
interstate commerce by affecting tourism, sci-
entific research, potential future markets in fur
pelts and the agricultural/livestock communi-
ty.93 Additionally, Judge Wilkinson reasoned
that while the regulation may involve a moral
purpose, “this does not undermine the eco-
nomic basis of the regulation.”94 Conversely,
the dissent in Gibbs argued that the activity (i.e.
the taking of an endangered species) was non-
economic and the aggregation of the activity
did not have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.95
The Supreme Court has only directly
addressed the constitutionality of a federal
environmental law in a dissent.96 In SWANCC,
a consortium of Illinois municipalities wanted
to fill a few small ponds to create a landfill.97
The consortium contacted the Army Corps of
Engineers “to determine if a landfill permit was
required under section 404(a) of the Clean
Water Act.”98 The Corps declined to issue a per-
mit to fill the ponds to create a landfill, based
upon its Migratory Bird Rule.99 The SWANCC
majority did not reach the Commerce Clause
issue in holding that the Corps’ rule was an
invalid statutory interpretation of section
404(a) of the CWA.100
However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens for-
mulated a defense to a Commerce Clause
attack on the Corps’ Migratory Bird Rule in par-
ticular and on federal environment laws in gen-
eral.101 Justice Stevens reasoned that the Army
Corps of Engineers’ interpretation of the CWA
did not violate the Commerce Clause because
“[t]he causal connection between the filling of
wetlands and the decline of commercial activi-
ties [e.g. birdwatching] associated with migra-
tory birds is not ‘attenuated,’ it is direct and
concrete.”102 Citing Justice Holmes’ decision in
Missouri v. Holland,103 Justice Stevens also noted
that the protection of migratory birds under
the CWA “is a textbook example of a national
problem.”104 Thus, Stevens argued, the protec-
tion of migratory birds is not simply a local
land use concern, but interstate commerce and
therefore, subject to federal regulation.
IV.   Application of the New Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence to the Facts in
Swanson Mining.
A.   An Easy Case?
At first glance, Swanson Mining appears to
be an easy case. The D.C. Circuit agreed that
section 7 prohibits FERC from issuing a license
for any water project on a river that is desig-
nated under WSRA. Since Gibbons, Congress













Jeff L. Massey Volume 8, Number 1
90.  National Association, 130 F.3d at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dis-
senting). 
91.  214 F.3d 483, 506 (4th. Cir. 2000).
92.  Id. at 491.
93.  Id. at 492.
94.  Id. at 493. 
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late channels of interstate commerce, such as
navigable waterways. Thus, since the WSRA
merely regulates a channel of interstate com-
merce, there should be no constitutional issue.
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the
majority in SWANCC stated: “[i]n Riverside
Bayview Homes we recognized that Congress
intended the phrase navigable waters to
include at least some waters that would not be
deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical mean-
ing of the term.”105 This would seem to allow
the regulation of waters that are non-navigable
such as the tributary on which the dam was to
be refurbished in Swanson Mining.
The problem, however, is that Chief Justice
Rehnquist goes on to indicate that the term
navigable, while elastic, does have limits:
“[Congress’] traditional jurisdiction [is] over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact
or which could reasonably be so made.”106
Here, a steep mountain stream would be
unlikely to be navigable even during periods of
heavy flow. Additionally, it is unlikely that the
waters of a mountain stream could reasonably
be made navigable through construction. Thus,
arguably, the Supreme Court would be unlikely
to view the denial of a license to build a dam
on a small non-navigable stream as a legiti-
mate exercise of the federal regulation of a
channel of interstate commerce.107
The next question is whether section 7 is a
legitimate exercise of Congress’ power to regu-
late the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce or “things” traveling in interstate com-
merce.108 The term instrumentalities has general-
ly been defined to include vehicles that move
goods in interstate commerce.109 A hydroelec-
tric dam is neither a vehicle nor a thing travel-
ing in interstate commerce. A hydroelectric
dam is more akin to a factory than a vehicle or
a product, in that it produces a product (elec-
tricity) for sale in interstate commerce.
Following this logic, section 7 represents nei-
ther a legitimate regulation of an instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce nor, as in contrast to
Reno, the legitimate regulation of a thing trav-
eling in interstate commerce. 
Finally, under Lopez and Morrison, Congress
may regulate an activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce, even if it occurs
wholly intrastate.110 This issue is subdivided
between commercial and non-commercial
activities.111 In Swanson Mining, what the plain-
tiff wanted to do was clearly economic or com-
mercial: refurbishing a dam to provide electric-
ity to power purchasers. In the aggregate, the
regulation of even small dams, as in Swanson
Mining, substantially affects interstate com-
merce.112 It would appear that under the cur-
rent Commerce Clause standards, section 7 of
the WSRA is a valid exercise of Congress’ abil-
ity to regulate activities having a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.
B.  Could the Plaintiff in Swanson Mining
Succeed with a Commerce Clause 
Challenge to Section 7 of the WSRA?
Nevertheless, it is possible that the plain-
tiff in Swanson Mining could succeed in a
Commerce Clause challenge. First, the plaintiff
could argue that the facts in this case are sim-
ilar to those in Jones. In Jones, the fact that the
building was “used to receive natural gas” from
utilities that were outside the state did not
indicate that the property fit under the federal
arson statute’s jurisdictional hook.113 The
plaintiff in Swanson Mining could argue that
receiving power from an out-of-state utility is
the equivalent to supplying an out-of-state
utility with power, and the latter act therefore
falls outside Congress’ Commerce Clause pow-
ers. 
However, there are significant problems
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nection to interstate commerce is more direct
than that of a purchaser of out of state-pro-
duced power. A hydroelectric dam exists in
order to provide a utility with power to sell to
rate-payers, whereas the owner of a residential
structure may choose whether or not to pur-
chase power from a utility. This basic divide
between production and consumption is sig-
nificant because the act of selling is more
directly connected to interstate commerce.
Additionally, in California v. FERC, the Supreme
Court affirmed the fact that licensing of hydro-
electric facilities is the domain of the Federal
Government and state governments have no
power over the licensing process.114 Thus, it
would be difficult to argue that the regulation
of hydroelectric dams is an area of traditional
state authority. Also, if the mere fact that a
home consumed energy gave Congress the
power to regulate activities that occurred
inside or outside the residence, this could lead
to federal zoning laws. The express purpose of
the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to
limit this type of federal encroachment on local
authority.115 There is no such concern with
FERC licensing of water projects. Thus, the reg-
ulation of dams is constitutional, whereas the
regulation of owner-occupied residences is
not.
Second, the plaintiff in Swanson Mining
could argue that the small size of the facility
involved should take it outside the scope of
Congress’ power to regulate interstate com-
merce. In enacting the Energy Security Act116
and by allowing small facilities to potentially
obtain waivers from the licensing provisions of
the FPA, Congress recognized that small dams
should be freed from federal control. Thus,
applying section 7 to a small dam violates the
Commerce Clause because even Congress did
not believe it should regulate small dams.117
The problem with this contention—that
the activity involved in this case is so small as
to fall outside Congress’ power to regulate
interstate commerce—is that it would require
the Court to overrule Wickard. The Supreme
Court in both Lopez118 and Morrison119 cited
Wickard as good law. Indeed, the Court in Lopez
affirmed Wickard by asserting that even if an
activity “may have been trivial by itself, that
was not enough to remove [it] from the scope
of federal regulation where, as here, [the] con-
tribution, taken together with that of many oth-
ers similarly situated, is far from trivial.”120 If
the Court overruled Wickard and stopped aggre-
gating economic activities, the Court would
move closer to Justice Thomas’ view on the
Commerce Clause.121
Finally, the plaintiff in Swanson Mining could
argue that FERC’s failure to grant a license was
invalid because it was enforcing section 7,
which is unconstitutional simply because it
falls outside the scope of Congress’ power to
regulate activities under the Commerce
Clause. To accept this argument, the Court
would have to extend the logic of Morrison
beyond its current limits.122 There is, however,
reason to believe that the Court might contin-
ue to narrow the scope of Congress’ authority
to regulate actions under the Commerce
Clause. 
In Lopez, the Court indicated that part of its
analysis involves a consideration “of legislative
findings.”123 However, in Morrison, the Court
indicated that “the existence of congressional
findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain
the constitutionality of Commerce Clause leg-
islation.”124 It appears that in Commerce













114.  495 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1990).
115.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
116.  42 U.S.C. § 2705 (2000).
117.  See id.
118.  514 U.S. at 549, 556.
119.  529 U.S. at 636.
120.  514 U.S. at 556.
121.  However, even if the Supreme Court were to adopt
Justice Thomas’ view completely, the federal regulation of hydro-
electric dams would remain constitutional as long as the dam
were on a navigable body of water.
122.  Morrison, with its attack on congressional findings and
non-economic regulations, represents, at least in terms of tone,
a more strident exposition of the new Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.
123.  514 U.S. at 562.
124.  529 U.S. at 614.
Jeff L. Massey Volume 8, Number 1
examining the reasoning behind a given piece
of legislation, and whether it represents a legit-
imate attempt to regulate an activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.125 The
Morrison Court apparently viewed the congres-
sional findings as a mere pretext for enacting
VAWA. In addition, since the Court views non-
economic regulations with great skepticism,126
the Morrison opinion suggests that there must
be a strong, legitimate connection between the
regulation involved and economic endeavors.
Section 7 was enacted for environmental
preservation purposes. If the Court were to
place greater emphasis on the purpose of an
act, then section 7 of the WSRA would be vul-
nerable.
SWANCC and Swanson Mining share similar
facts, since both involve an attempt by a pri-
vate interest to receive a license from a federal
agency that appears to run counter to a federal
environmental law.  In SWANCC, the Court
held, as discussed above, that the Corps had
misinterpreted the Clean Water Act in creating
its Migratory Bird Rule.127
If the Court had merely addressed the
agency’s interpretation of the statute, the
SWANCC decision would have few implications
for section 7 because the WSRA, unlike the
Migratory Bird Rule, is a federal statute and
not an agency rule. However, the consortium in
SWANCC alternatively argued that the rule was
an illegitimate exercise of power under the
Commerce Clause.128 Indeed, the Court’s dicta
suggests there may have been a legitimate
Commerce Clause issue involved. Chief Justice
Rhenquist wrote regarding the consortium’s
Commerce Clause argument against the Corps’
Migratory Bird Rule:
These arguments raise significant
constitutional questions. For example,
we would have to evaluate the precise
object or activity that, in aggregate,
substantially affects interstate com-
merce. This is not clear, for although
the Corps has claimed jurisdiction over
petitioner’s land because it contains
water areas used as habitat for migra-
tory birds, respondents now, post litem
motam, focus upon the fact that the reg-
ulated activity is petitioner’s municipal
landfill, which is “plainly of a commer-
cial nature.”129
This could be read to imply that the regu-
lation of land to preserve bird habitat may not
be constitutional, even though the activity
being regulated is economic. This would seem
to suggest that the Court will consider the pur-
pose of a regulation, as well as the activity that
is being regulated. If this is the case, Congress’
authority is in the process of being dramatical-
ly narrowed. Under this regime, the FPA would
be a valid exercise of congressional power
because it was enacted for the purpose of reg-
ulating an economic activity, whereas section 7
of the WSRA would be invalid because it was
enacted to preserve areas of aesthetic beauty.
If this were the case, a number of problems
would be created.  
Specifically, if the purpose behind any
given statute were considered, defenders of
section 7 would have to equate preservation
with an economic purpose. This would be a
similar argument to the one used by Judge
Wilkinson in Gibbs.130 In Gibbs, the appellate
court argued that the protection of wolves on
private land was an economic activity because
it implicated tourism and other economic
activities such as scientific research.131
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in National Association
of Home Builders held that the preservation of
biodiversity sufficiently implicates interstate
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is unclear whether the Court would view these
activities as economic since there appears to
be a step between the activity being regulated
and anything resembling commerce. This
attenuated connection between the activity
and commerce appears to be similar to the
connection that Congress tried to draw in its
findings in Morrison, which the Supreme Court
rejected.133 Proponents of the WSRA might find
themselves in a similar position as the propo-
nents of the VAWA were, making the strained
argument that section 7 was enacted for an
economic purpose.134
Nonetheless, while examining the underly-
ing purpose of a statute could be the next step
taken in narrowing congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause, it does not repre-
sent the current Commerce Clause test. The
current test focuses on the activity being regu-
lated and not the purpose. But if the Court
took this next step, a plethora of federal
statutes would be thrown into doubt, and Hodel
and many other cases would be overruled.135
Moreover, most environmental statutes would
be vulnerable.136 It is unclear at this point
whether the Court is interested in further
restricting Congress’ power to regulate activi-
ties under the Commerce Clause or merely
refining the current test as developed in Lopez.
However, if the Supreme Court were to consid-
er whether a statute was enacted for the pur-
pose of regulating something economic, this
would represent a radical departure from the
Supreme Court’s current test. Essentially, this
would be much closer to Justice Thomas’ per-
spective.137
Under the current Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, it would appear that section 7 of
the WSRA is safe. FERC’s ability to issue licens-
es to a hydroelectric dam represents the regu-
lation of a channel of interstate commerce.
Alternatively, if, as in Swanson Mining, the dam
is on a non-navigable stream, Section 7 of the
WSRA represents the regulation of an econom-
ic activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. If the plaintiff in Swanson Mining
were to bring a Commerce Clause challenge in
federal court today, that challenge would fail.
V.  Conclusion: Environmental Laws in
Danger.
While section 7 of the WSRA may not cur-
rently be in danger of being invalidated, other
environmental laws may be vulnerable.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will take a simi-
lar position on some of the environmental laws
that it took when it upheld a woman’s right to
an abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.138 In Casey, the Court rea-
soned that people had come to rely on the
right to have an abortion.139 Indeed, the Court
noted that many people “have ordered their
thinking and living around that case.”140 A sim-
ilar argument could be made regarding federal
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sions and ordered their lives based on the exis-
tence of these laws.141
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court appears
to be on course to potentially overturn por-
tions of some of the most important federal
environmental statutes. This comes at a time
when there is greater understanding, at least in
the scientific community, that the global envi-
ronment is threatened with substantial and
disruptive change.142 The Court appears to be
headed towards making decisions in the envi-
ronmental arena that are similar to past
Supreme Court’s decisions on civil rights and
labor rights made in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century.143
Although it appears unlikely that the con-
servative majority on the Court would heed the
wisdom of one of its most liberal members,
Justice Brennan’s words may be helpful in har-
monizing the Constitution with the specific
environmental problems we face today:
We look to the history of the time
of the framing and to the intervening
history of interpretation. But the ulti-
mate question must be: what do the
words of the text mean in our time? For
the genius of the Constitution rests not
in any static meaning it may have had
in a world that is dead and gone, but in
the adaptability of its great principles
to cope with current problems and cur-
rent needs. 
We as a society currently need greater fed-
eral involvement in environmental protection
and not less. Sadly, the Supreme Court may
not see this need. If not, it will be for future
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